Complete Works of Onasander Page 6

  (3) SIEGE ENGINES

  [3] Of the many and various siege engines the general will make use according as he has opportunity. It is not my part to say that he must use battering rams or ‘city-destroyers’ or the sambuca, or wheeled towers or covered sheds or catapults; all this depends upon the luck, the wealth, and the power of the combatants, and upon the skill of the workmen who accompany the army for the purpose of building engines. [4] The task of a general’s peculiar skill, if he wishes to employ engines, is to use them at some one locality — for he would not have a sufficient supply of engines to place them in a circle completely about the wall unless the city were very small, — and, dividing his army into many parts, he should [station his engines at certain points and should] command his men to bring forward their ladders against the other parts of the wall, since in this manner the besieged are rendered helpless. [5] For if the besieged disregard the other parts of the wall and only make a defence against the attacks of the engines, all the besiegers who attack with ladders will easily climb over the wall without opposition, but if the defenders divide their forces and send aid to each part as the battle grows more violent through the attack of these engines, those who are left and who do not venture to fight with them will be unable to repel the advancing menace. [6] On this account, just as a good wrestler, the general must make feints and threats at many points, worrying and deceiving his opponents, here and there, at many places, striving, by securing a firm hold upon one part, to overturn the whole structure of the city.

  (4) ON ENDING SIEGES BY VIGOROUS ACTION

  [7] If a general desire quickly to capture a fort or city or camp and his force grow weary, while he wishes not to spare one hour from attacking the defences, he should split his army into divisions, as many as he considers sufficient, according to the number of his men and the extent of the besieged city, and then he should attack immediately at nightfall with the first division, ordering the second to remain near in readiness, but the third and fourth and fifth, if there chance to be a fifth, he should order to sleep. [8] Then when the first division has attacked for some time, he should recall it and send it to its quarters to sleep, but he should give the signal to the second division to march out from the camp; at this point the commander of the third division should arouse and arm his troops. [9] After the second division has fought as long a time as the first, he will lead out his third division and order the second to rest; after this the catapults, then in order the fifth, while the soldiers in turn rest from fighting. [10] Thus, at daybreak, those who attacked first at night should again attack first at dawn, remaining at the front two hours, if there are six divisions, but a little longer if five; three hours if four divisions, and four hours if three divisions; on their return they should receive their rations in order, the first division, then the second, and so on to the last, like the revolution of a wheel. [11] With this plan, there are two results: unceasing attacks by night and day, while the attackers, taking their turns at rest, will fight freshly and vigorously. [12] But no one should believe that the besieged, even if very numerous, could use this same stratagem, for in danger no one would wish to enjoy sleep even if it were permitted, since from fear of peril, during the time at which one is resting, he lies sleepless, as though the city were on the point of capture. The besieged, moreover, even if their assailants are few, defend themselves with all their strength, and everything within the walls of the city is in a state of excitement, in even greater terror of the future, as though if one minute detail were overlooked, they would all be lost. [13] On this account there is every reason why men wearied, without an hour’s rest, tired by guard-duty and labour, and fearful for the future, should defend themselves more weakly, or should send out messengers to discuss the surrender of the city.

  (5) HOW THE GENERAL SHOULD REST

  [14] “But has the general himself, then,” some one may perhaps say, “been made of adamant or iron to have remained alone without sleep throughout all these deeds?” Certainly not; but during the time that he sleeps — and this must be little and cut short — he should hand over the command of the army to one of his most trusted and courageous officers, who is also second only to himself in military rank.

  (6) PARTS OF A CITY SEEMINGLY MOST IMPREGNABLE ARE OFTEN EASY TO CAPTURE

  [15] Sometimes those parts of a city that seem precipitous and are fortified by the sheer rocky cliffs, offer the besiegers greater chances for victory than do fortresses erected by human hands, for those places whose fortification relies upon natural strength are wont to be less carefully watched and guarded by soldiers. [16] Then the wise general considers what he must do, and encouraging a few of his bravest soldiers with promise of reward, men who are best able to climb up by using either the natural unevenness of the ground or else ladders, he accomplishes his attempt; for descending stealthily within the walls they break down a postern or open a gate.

  (7) THE ADVANTAGE OF TRUMPETS

  [17] Some such device as this would be of great assistance — if those who have succeeded in mounting the walls draw up trumpets after them. For a hostile trumpet heard at night from the walls brings great terror to the besieged, as if they had already been overcome by force, so that abandoning the gates and fortifications they flee. The result is that breaking down the gates and meeting the walls by ladders is easily accomplished by soldiers on the outside since no one of the enemy resists any longer. Thus in some such way it is possible that one trumpeter, even without arms, can capture a city.

  (8) CONDUCT OF A GENERAL AFTER THE CAPTURE OF A CITY

  [18] If the general capture by force some city, flourishing in power and in the number of its citizens, and if he fear or suspect that the inhabitants advancing in companies and crowds may defend themselves against the invaders, or that seizing the heights and the citadel of the town they may advance from there and cause great loss to their opponents, he should command his own soldiers not to slay unarmed men of the enemy. [19] For so long as every man expects to be killed after capture, he wishes first to do some deed of bravery, and even though he suffer, yet to accomplish something, and many inhabitants of towns have driven out enemies even when introduced into the town, or, failing in this, have crowded into the fortified citadel from which they have caused great labour and loss to their adversaries, who must enter into a second . . . and longer siege, one that is sometimes more distressing and attended by great hardships. [20] But if the above-mentioned command should be published, quickly all the inhabitants, or, needless to say, at least the majority, would throw down their arms. For every one who through anger wishes to defend himself, will be compelled to lay down his arms for fear that his neighbour may not be of the same mind, so that even if all should wish to keep their weapons, on account of this suspicion of one another, each one fearing that he alone may be taken with arms on his person, hastens to give up his weapons. For a sudden emergency does not give time for the common opinion to become known. And those who are ready to protect their own lives so long as no hope of safety has been announced, strive to avert the imminent danger, if not as they wish, then as they must, but when they perceive a small hope of safety, they become suppliants instead of enemies. [21] Thus this proclamation compels even those who wish to keep their arms to throw them down. The death of soldiers in battle admits of easy consolation, for it seems to have been the price of victory, but in victory and the occupation of cities it is a matter of sorrow to the conquerors, as an evidence of thoughtlessness rather than bravery. [22] If, however, the general is revengeful toward the conquered, he should not think that no harm is done them if his men do not slay on the spot all whom they meet, since at his leisure he will be able to plan in perfect safety his uncontested vengeance and the fate that the conquered must undergo.

  (9) NECESSITY OF SENDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN INTO A CITY TO CAPTURE IT BY FAMINE

  [23] If the general should despair of sacking a city by force and should settle down to a prolonged siege, believing that he will capture the city if he has
pressed it hard by famine, he should take prisoners whatever persons are still in the country. Of these, to the men in the prime of life he should assign work on the defences such as seems best to him, but the women and children and feeble men and old people he should send of his own accord into the city. These will be useless in action but will consume more quickly the supplies of the besieged and will serve the purpose of enemies rather than friends.

  (10) CONDUCT OF THE GENERAL AFTER VICTORY

  [24] If the war should chance to turn out in everything according to the general’s desire, so as to put a complete end to the enemy’s activity, he should not be overweening in his good fortune, but gracious; he should not show violent stupidity but kindly goodwill; for the former excites envy, the latter causes emulation. [25] Now envy is a pain of mind that successful men cause their neighbours, but emulation is imitation of the good qualities of others; such is the difference between them that envy is the desire that another may not have good fortune, but emulation is the desire to equal the possessions of another. [26] A good man, then, will be not only a brave defender of his fatherland and a competent leader of an army but also for the permanent protection of his own reputation will be a sagacious strategist.

  The Greek Text

  A mosaic in Istanbul’s Hagia Sophia, showing Leo VI paying homage to Christ — Leo VI, called the Wise (866-912), was the Byzantine Emperor from 886 to 912. The second ruler of the Macedonian dynasty, he was very well-read, leading to his epithet. Leo was one of many emperors to be influenced by Onasander’s work.

  Contents of the Greek Text

  In this section of the eBook, readers can view the original Greek text of Onasander’s Strategikos. You may wish to Bookmark this page for future reference.

  CONTENTS

  ΠΡΟΟΙΜΙΟΝ

  I. Περὶ αἱρέσεως στρατηγοῦ

  II. Περὶ ἀγαθοῦ στρατηγοῦ διαίρεσις

  III. Περὶ τοῦ ἔχειν τὸν στρατηγὸν βουλευτάς

  IV. Περὶ τοῦ ὅτι δεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ πολέμου ἐξ εὐλόγου αἰτίας ἐπάγειν

  V. Περὶ τοῦ ἐξιλεοῦσθαι πρῶτον ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν τὸ θεῖον ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐξάγων εἰς πόλεμον

  VI. Περὶ τοῦ ἄγειν ἐν τάξει τὸ στρατόπεδον

  VII. Περὶ τοῦ ὅταν διὰ στενῶν μέλλῃ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἄγειν

  VIII. Περὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν χάρακα

  IX. Περὶ τοῦ συνεχῶς ὑπαλλάσσειν τὰ ἄπληκτα

  X. α´. Περὶ τοῦ δεῖν γυμνάζειν τὸν στρατὸν ἀδείας οὔσης

  XI. α´. Περὶ τοῦ ὅτι δεῖ τῶν πολεμίων σχηματιζομένων φεύγειν μὴ ἁπλῶς καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἔχεσθαι τῆς διώξεως

  XΙI. Περὶ ἀριστοποιΐας

  XIII. Περὶ τοῦ εἶναι τὸν στρατηγὸν εὔθυμον ἐν ταῖς δυσπραγίαις

  XIV. α´. Πότε δεῖ φόβον ἐμβάλλειν τῷ στρατεύματι τῷ ἰδίῳ τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων

  XV. Ὅτι διαφοραὶ πολλαὶ τῶν τάξεων

  XVI. Ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ἀντιπόλεμον καὶ τὸ ἴδιον συντάξει

  XVII. Ὅτι τοὺς ψιλοὺς ἀκοντιστὰς καὶ τοξότας καὶ σφενδονιστὰς πρώτους στήσει τῆς φάλαγγος

  XVIII. Περὶ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς τραχέσι τόποις τάττειν τοὺς ψιλούς

  XIX. Περὶ τοῦ χωρία ἔχειν τὰς παρατάξεις δι’ ὧν ὀφείλουσιν οἱ ψιλοὶ ἐντὸς τῶν κοντῶν εἰσερχόμενοι ὑποστέλλεσθαι

  XX. Ὅπως δεῖ, ἐὰν ἀπορῇ ψιλῆς συμμαχίας ὁ στρατηγός, οἱ δὲ πολέμιοι εὐπορῶσιν, ἐπιφέρεσθαι αὐτοῖς

  XXI. Περὶ τοῦ μὴ εἰς πολὺ μῆκος ἐκτείνειν τὴν φάλαγγα τὰς κυκλώσεις τῶν ἐναντίων φοβουμένους

  XXII. Περὶ τοῦ ἔχειν κεχωρισμένους ἐπιλέκτους εἰς βοήθειαν τῶν καταπονουμένων. περὶ τοῦ ἔχειν ἐγκρύμματα

  XXIII. Περὶ τοῦ ἐν τῶν καιρῷ αὐτῷ τῆς μάχης ἐκφωνεῖν χαρμόσυνα τοῖς ὑπηκόοις· εἰ καὶ ψευδῆ, ὅμως συμφέρει

  XXIV. Περὶ τοῦ οἰκείους πρὸς οἰκείους καὶ γνωρίμους πρὸς γνωρίμους τάττειν

  XXV. Περὶ τοῦ μὴ δι’ ἑαυτοῦ διδόναι τὸν στρατηγὸν τὰ σημεῖα εἴτε τῆς συμβολῆς εἴτε ἄλλης τινὸς πράξεως, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν ἡγεμόνων

  XXVI. Περὶ τοῦ μὴ μόνον συνθήματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρασυνθήματα διδόναι

  XXVII. Περὶ τοῦ μὴ λύειν τὰς τάξεις μήτε ἐν ταῖς διατάξεσι μήτε ἐν ταῖς ὑποχωρήσεσι

  XXVIII. Περὶ τοῦ δι’ ἐπιμελείας ἔχειν τὸν στρατηγὸν λαμπρὸν ἐκτάττειν τὸ στράτευμα

  XXIX. Περὶ τοῦ ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τῆς συμβολῆς ἀλαλάζειν

  XXX. Ὅτι δεῖ τὸν στρατηγὸν πρὸ τοῦ πολέμου συλλογίζεσθαι, τίς ὀφείλει ὑπαντῆσαι κατὰ τὴν συμβολὴν τῷ δεῖνι καὶ τίς τῷ ἄλλῳ καὶ οὕτως καθεξῆς ἐξετάζειν τοὺς ἰδίους ἄρχοντας πρὸς τοὺς τῶν ἐναντίων

  XXXI. Περὶ τοῦ, ἐὰν οἱ ἐναντίοι προτερεύωσι τῷ ἱππικῷ, ἐκλέγεσθαι στενοὺς τόπους

  XXXII. Περὶ τοῦ μηδὲν παρακεκινδυνευμένον ποιεῖν τὸν στρατηγὸν

  XXXIII. Περὶ τοῦ μὴ τὸν στρατηγὸν αὐτοχειρὶ πολεμεῖν

  XXXIV. Περὶ τοῦ εὐεργετεῖν κατὰ τὸ μέτρον ἕνα ἕκαστον τῶν ἀνδραγαθούντων

  XXXV. α´. Ὅτι οὐ χρὴ πάντοτε ἐπιτρέπειν τὰς ἁρπαγάς, καὶ ὅτι τὰ σώματα οὐ χρὴ ἁρπάζειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν στρατηγὸν πιπράσκειν

  XXXVI. α´. Περὶ τοῦ θάπτειν τοὺς ἐν πολέμῳ ἀναιρουμένους

  XXXVII. Περὶ τοῦ ἐν καιρῷ εἰρήνης μὴ ἀφυλάκτως εἶναι

  XXXVIII. α´. Περὶ τοῦ τὰς προσαγόμενος πόλεις ἐν ἀδείᾳ ἔχειν καὶ φιλανθρωπίᾳ

  XXXIX. α´. Περὶ τοῦ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἐν γνώσει εἶναι τῆς τῶν ἄστρων κινήσεως

  XL. Περὶ πολιορκίας

  XLI. Περὶ τοῦ ἔχειν ἐνέδρας τὸν πολιορκοῦντα πρὸ τῶν πυλῶν

  XLII. α´. Περὶ τοῦ ὅτι ὁ φόβος ψευδὴς μάντις ἐστίν

  ΠΡΟΟΙΜΙΟΝ

  [1] Ἱππικῶν μὲν λόγων ἢ κυνηγετικῶν ἢ ἁλιευτικῶν τε αὖ καὶ γεωργικῶν συνταγμάτων προσφώνησιν ἡγοῦμαι πρέπειν ἀνθρώποις, οἷς πόθος ἔχεσθαι τοιῶνδε ἔργων, στρατηγικῆς δὲ περὶ θεωρίας, ὦ Κόϊντε Οὐηράνιε, Ῥωμαίοις καὶ μάλιστα Ῥωμαίων τοῖς τὴν συγκλητικὴ
ν ἀριστοκρατίαν λελογχόσι καὶ κατὰ τὴν Σεβαστοῦ Καίσαρος ἐπιφροσύνην ταῖς τε ὑπάτοις καὶ στρατηγικαῖς ἐξουσίαις κοσμουμένοις διά τε παιδείαν, ἧς οὐκ ἐπ’ ὀλίγον ἔχουσιν ἐμπειρίαν, καὶ προγόνων ἀξίωσιν. [2] ἀνέθηκα δὲ πρώτοις σφίσι τόνδε τὸν λόγον οὐχ ὡς ἀπείροις στρατηγίας, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τῇδε θαρρήσας, ᾗ τὸ μὲν ἀμαθὲς τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ παρ’ ἄλλῳ κατορθούμενον ἠγνόησεν, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἐπιστήμῃ τῷ καλῶς ἔχοντι προσεμαρτύρησεν. [3] ὅθεν, εἰ καὶ παρὰ πολλοῖς φανείη νενοημένα τὰ παρ’ ἐμοῦ συντεταγμένα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἂν ἡσθείην, ὅτι μὴ μόνον στρατηγικὰς συνεταξάμην ὑφηγήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ στρατηγικῆς ἐστοχασάμην καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς φρονήσεως, εὐτυχοίην τ’ ἄν, εἰ, ἃ δὴ Ῥωμαίοις δυνάμει καὶ δι’ ἔργων πέπρακται, ταῦτ’ ἐγὼ λόγῳ περιλαβεῖν ἱκανὸς εἶναι παρὰ τοιούτοις ἀνδράσι δοκιμασθείην.