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  II. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A GOOD GENERAL

  [1] So that general is to be praised who is good, wealthy, and well-born, but the excellent general who is not wealthy is not to be rejected, even if of humble family. [2] The general when chosen must be trustworthy, affable, prompt, calm, not so lenient as to be despised, nor so severe as to be hated, so that he may neither through favours loosen the bonds of discipline, nor estrange the army through fear. [3] He must appoint as lieutenants, captains, and colonels, as well as other officers, if it seems necessary, men who are most loyal to their country, most faithful, and most vigorous — though there is nothing to prevent their being of the greatest wealth and nobility. [4] As the number of generals to be chosen is small, they may be easily judged from their characters, even if the dignity of wealth and birth is lacking; but this is not the case with the multitude of subordinate officers. [5] And so by off-hand judgment required at a crucial moment the nobility have to be preferred, but when there is no urgency, the wealthy, since those who have abundant means can spend money on the soldiery and make them gifts; for a slight expenditure by the officers for the benefit of their men makes the rank and file better disposed; and the pledges of greater rewards can be depended upon when made by those who have more at stake — that is, if the confidence a general ought to inspire is not altogether furnished by his character.

  III. THE GENERAL’S ADVISORY COUNCIL

  [1] The general should either choose a staff to participate in all his councils and share in his decisions, men who will accompany the army especially for this purpose, or summon as members of his council a selected group of the most respected commanders, since it is not safe that the opinions of one single man, on his sole judgment, should be adopted. [2] For the isolated decision of one man, unsupported by others, can see no farther than his own ingenuity, but that which has the additional testimony of councillors guarantees against mistake. [3] However, the general must neither be so undecided that he entirely distrusts himself, nor so obstinate as not to think that anyone can have a better idea than his own; for such a man, either because he listens to every one else and never to himself, is sure to meet with frequent misfortune, or else, through never listening to others but always to himself, is bound to make many very costly mistakes.

  IV. THE NECESSITY OF A REASONABLE CAUSE FOR WAR

  [1] The causes of war, I believe, should be marshalled with the greatest care; it should be evident to all that one fights on the side of justice. For then the gods also, kindly disposed, become comrades in arms to the soldiers, and men are more eager to take their stand against the foe. [Something of a commonplace even in antiquity; for typical expressions see Thucydides II.74; Xenophon, Cyropedia, I.5.13‑14; Dionysius of Halicarnassus II.72.3.º ] [2] For with the knowledge that they are not fighting an aggressive but a defensive war, with consciences free from evil designs, they contribute a courage that is complete; while those who believe an unjust war is displeasing to heaven, because of this very opinion enter the war with fear, even if they are not about to face danger at the hands of the enemy. [3] On this account the general must first announce, by speeches and through embassies, what he wishes to obtain and what he is not willing to concede, in order that it may appear that, because the enemy will not agree to his reasonable demands, it is of necessity, not of his own preference, that he is taking the field. He should call heaven to witness that he is entering the war without offence, since he has not failed to consider the dangers that fall to the lot of combatants, and is not deliberately seeking, in every possible manner, to ruin the enemy. [4] He should know that not only is a firm foundation necessary for houses and walls — for if this is weak the superstructures will also collapse — , but that in war also it is only after one has prepared a firm beginning, and has laid a safe foundation, that he should take the field. For those whose cause is weak, when they take up the heavy burden of war, are quickly crushed by it and fail. [5] Just as a careful ship-captain, after he has given his ship a thorough overhauling and outfitting while in harbour, and has done everything within his own power, must then commit his craft to Fortune, so it is most disgraceful and dangerous for a general, after he has given intimations of a beginning of war, implying an immediate advance of his forces by both land and sea, then to back out. [6] For while every one laughs at folly and rashness, we despise weakness, and the enemy — whoever they may be — even if they experience no harm, have good reason to hate the would-be invaders, as men who have not lacked the will, but lacked the ability to put a matter through.

  V. PROPITIATION OF THE DIVINE POWER BY THE GENERAL BEFORE LEADING THE ARMY INTO BATTLE

  Before the general leads out his army he must see that it is purified, by such rites as either the laws or soothsayers direct, and must avert whatever taint there is in the state or in any citizen, by expiatory sacrifices.

  VI. ON MAINTAINING MILITARY FORMATION

  [1] The general must lead his entire army in military formation, even if he is not on the point of battle, but is completing a long journey and a march of many days through either a friendly or a hostile country; through a friendly country, that the soldiers may become accustomed to remaining in rank, to keeping to their own companies, and to following their own leaders; through a hostile country, to guard against sudden attacks from ambush, that the soldiers may not be thrown into disorder at a critical moment, running against and stumbling over one another, and so accomplishing nothing but rather suffering severe loss; they must proceed, prepared at the same time for marching and for battle, remembering their watchword and keeping their eyes on their comrades in the ranks. [2] The general must attempt to make the marching order of his army as compact as possible, and should lead his troops through such a country — so far as he is able — that the ranks may not be so cramped, being narrow and having no width, that they cannot be deployed to a considerable distance laterally. [3] For lines so disposed suffer more under sudden attacks of the enemy and are least effective; should the enemy with a more extended front encounter the head of the column, they would easily put it to flight, just as in battle one army, by outflanking an enemy advancing in column formation, routs it. Should the enemy attack the centre of the column from the flank, they would quickly pierce it and cut through — for if the column wheels to meet the enemy, forming a phalanx, even this, lacking depth, will make but a weak resistance — ; and, finally, should the enemy attack the rear of the column, the fighting with back to the foe would be dangerous and entail obvious destruction; and even if the soldiers in the column venture to face about and form a new front, the battle would amount to the same thing as the previous attack on the advance guard, i.e., the enemy would quickly surround them. [4] Furthermore, assistance is difficult to give and ineffectual, for when those in the rear desire to give aid to the head of the column, or those at the head to those in the rear, their arrival is delayed and ill-timed, however eager they may be to cover the many stades which separate them from the van or the rear respectively.

  [5] A marching formation that is compact and rectangular — not very much longer than its width — is safe and easy to manage for every emergency. A too greatly extended line of march may at times produce panic and apprehension due to uncertainty, for sometimes the leaders, after descending from mountains into treeless and level regions, observing those in the rear still descending, have thought the enemy were attacking, so that they have been on the point of marching against their own men as enemies, and some have even come to blows.

  [6] The general must place his medical equipment, pack animals, and all his baggage in the centre of his army, not outside. Should he consider that his rear is not quite secure and undisturbed he should form his rear guard of the most vigorous and courageous soldiers, realizing that, in the light of experience, the rear is no less important than the front.

  [7] He must send ahead cavalry as scouts to search the roads, especially when advancing through a wooded country, or a wilderness broken up by ridges. For ambuscades are freque
ntly set by the enemy, and sometimes failure to detect them brings complete disaster to the opposing side, while their discovery, by a slight precaution, attests to the general of the enemy great prudence on the part of his adversary. [8] For in a level and treeless country a general survey is sufficient for a preliminary investigation; for a cloud of dust announces the approach of the enemy by day, and burning fires light up a near-by encampment at night.

  [9] If the general is not about to form his line of battle, but is hurrying to be the first to arrive at a given point, he should lead his army by night marches also, provided he thinks it safe. But if he intends to decide the issue by battle as soon as he comes in sight of the enemy, he should at once advance slowly and not try to march too far; for in many cases, before the actual fighting, fatigue lessens men’s physical fitness.

  [10] When passing through the country of an ally, the general must order his troops not to lay hands on the country, nor to pillage or destroy; for every army under arms is ruthless, when it has the opportunity of exercising power, and the close view of desirable objects entices the thoughtless to greediness; while small reasons alienate allies or make them quite hostile. [11] But the country of the enemy he should ruin and burn and ravage, for loss of money and shortage of crops reduce warfare, as abundance nourishes it. But first he should let the enemy know what he intends to do; for often the expectation of impending terror has brought those who have been endangered, before they have suffered at all, to terms which they previously would not have wished to accept; but when they have once suffered a reverse, in the belief that nothing can be worse they are careless of future perils. [12] If he intends to encamp for some time in the enemy’s country, he must destroy only things of such a number and sort as he himself will not need; whatever, if preserved, will be of advantage to his friends he should spare.

  [13] When the army is recruited to full strength, he must not settle down and stay either in his own country, or in that of a subject nation, or in that of an ally; for he will consume his own crops, and do more damage to his friends than to his enemies. He should lead out his forces over the frontier as soon as possible, if matters are safe at home; for from the enemy’s country, if it is fertile and wealthy, he will have abundant provisions, but if it is not, he will at least not be injuring a friendly country, and he will still derive great gain even from the distress of the hostile country.

  [14] He should consider the matter of supplies, and the convoying of his merchants by land and sea, that they may arrive safely at his base of supplies, and that they may without hesitation transport their cargoes of provisions.

  VII. ON LEADING AN ARMY THROUGH NARROW DEFILES

  [1] Whenever the general intends to march through a narrow pass, or to lead his army over mountainous and difficult country, he must send ahead part of his force to occupy the mountain-passes and the defiles, lest the enemy, coming first, make a stand on the summits and prevent the army from crossing. [2] This he should observe even if fearing an attack by the enemy. For naturally it is not advantageous to take the initiative, without also recognizing the necessity of taking precautions against injury; nor is it necessary to outstrip the enemy in making an invasion into his country, without taking measures to prevent the enemy from marching against one’s own country.

  VIII. ON MAKING A PALISADED CAMP

  [1] When encamping in the territory of the enemy, the general should fortify his camp with a palisade and a ditch, even if planning to remain in camp but one day; for on account of sudden and unexpected attacks, a fortified camp of this sort will be safe and never regretted. He should place guards, even if he believes the enemy to be at a great distance, just as if they were at hand. [2] Whenever the enemy are not attacking, and he intends to encamp for some time, either for the purpose of ravaging the country, or to await a more advantageous time for battle, he must choose a locality that is not marshy, nor damp; for such places by their rising vapours and rank smell bring disease and infection to the army, and both impair the health of many and kill many, so that the soldiers are left few in number and weakened in strength.

  IX. ON CONTINUALLY CHANGING CAMP

  [1] The general will find it advantageous and healthful for his army not to remain long in the same camp, unless it is winter and the army happens to be in huts on account of the time of year; for the necessary bodily excrement, deposited in the same place, gives off rank vapours and taints all the surrounding air. [2] In winter quarters he should exercise his army and train it to be skilled in war and accustomed to danger, permitting no idleness nor relaxation; for idleness makes the body soft and weak, while relaxation makes the soul cowardly and worthless; since pleasures, capturing the passions by the enticement of daily habit, corrupt even the most courageous man. [3] For this reason the soldiers must never be without occupation. When after some time spent in idleness they are compelled to go against the enemy, they do not go willingly nor do they long stand their ground, but because they have departed from their former habits, they quickly become dismayed, even before making trial of danger, and even if they do make trial, they quickly retreat, being incapable either of feeling hope or of sustaining the stress of battle.

  X. (1) THE NEED FOR CONTROLLING THE ARMY IN TIME OF PEACE

  [1] On this account it is the duty of a good general to prepare what is useful for war, when the necessity of a pitched battle is not pressing. He should also assign unproductive tasks to keep the army in good condition. For it is sufficient relaxation for soldiers, even if they are very weary, to exercise in arms without the dangers involved in a real battle. The general should train his troops in some such manner as the following.

  [2] First arming the soldiers, he should draw them up in military formation that they may become practised in maintaining their formation; that they may become familiar with the faces and names of one another; that each soldier may learn by whom he stands and where and after how many. In this way, by one sharp command, the whole army will immediately form ranks. Then he should instruct the army in open and close order; in turning to the left and right; the interchange, taking distance, and closing up of files; the division into files; the arrangement and extension of files to form the phalanx; withdrawing of files for greater depth of the phalanx; battle formation facing in two directions, when the rear guard turns to fight an encircling enemy; and he should instruct them thoroughly in the calls for retreat.

  [3] For just as those who begin to learn to play a musical instrument, in placing their fingers on the stops of the pipe or on the strings of the lyre, often set one finger on one and then another on another, without observing the interval that produces harmony, and then, with great effort, extending their fingers, they lift them slowly and slowly place them again; whereas practised players, no longer giving any evidence of care, with disciplined hand swiftly change from one note to another, lightly checking or opening the flow of air at will or lightly plucking the strings; in just this manner men unpractised and inexperienced in military formations, with great confusion and failure to find one another, will only after loss of much time take their places; but those who are well trained in formations quickly — indeed automatically, so to speak — rush to their stations, presenting a harmonious, I may say, and beautiful sight.

  [4] Next after dividing the army into two parts he should lead them against each other in a sham battle, armed with staves or the shafts of javelins; if there should be any fields covered with clods, he should command them to throw clods; if they have any leather straps, the soldiers should use them in the battle. [This passage is derived from Xenophon, Cyropaedia, II.3.17‑18. Compare the Introduction. ] Pointing out to the soldiers ridges or hills or steep ascents, he should command them to charge and seize these places; and sometimes arming the soldiers with the weapons I have just mentioned, he should place some on the hilltops and send the others to dislodge them. He should praise those who stand firm without retreating, and those who succeed in dislodging their opponents. [5] For from such exercise and trai
ning the army is kept in good health, eating and drinking everything with heartier appetite, even if the fare is plain, desiring nothing more luxurious. For the hunger and thirst derived from toil are a sufficient relish and a sweet draught, and muscles become harder and untiring; and trained by sweating, puffing, and panting, and exposed to summer heat and the bitter cold under the open sky, the soldiers become accustomed to future hardships.

  [6] In the same way the general should train his cavalry, arranging practice battles, both pursuits and hand-to-hand struggles and skirmishes in the plain and around the base of the hills, as far as it is possible to go in the broken country; for it is not possible to charge uphill nor to ride downhill.

  (2) FORAGING EXPEDITIONS